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China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Its Prospects and Implications for Gwadar and Balochistan

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ABSTRACT

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a multibillion-dollar project of direct investment in a corridor of energy and infrastructure. Besides, there are good potential prospects like the construction of port and road facilities, airports, and energy corridors. It has implications for Balochistan and Gwadar. Although previous studies have highlighted the problems of Balochistan, this paper presents a theoretical framework with reference to the economic corridor. The study has a hypothesis: Baloch people have some reservations about multi-purpose projects. It has impacted the geographic and demographic profile of Balochistan. Other projects are waiting for consideration, such as those related to the water shortage, technical and vocational centers, and employment opportunities. The purpose of this study is to examine the implications and prospects. Every project should aim to facilitate the local masses. The government should shrink dependency and focus on imports, trade imbalances, and foreign loans to resurface its image for elections. It has been discovered that CPEC will cause social change and stratification, as well as Communist influence on minds and effects on aquatic life at Gwadar Harbor. The study suggests: 7% of Gwadar Port Authority revenue for Gwadar and Balochistan; job quotas; parity; public-private partnerships; etc. Finally, it concludes that Gwadar and Balochistan are not reaping immense benefits from this billionaire project. Under the 18th Amendment, Gwadar should be subject to the Balochistan government, the province should be autonomous, etc. Data was gathered through secondary sources such as printed and electronic media. Besides, theoretical, and conceptual frameworks are present in the paper. This is a qualitative study with deductive reasoning to analyze and interpret the collected data.

Keywords: Gwadar, CPEC, Impacts, Implication, Balochistan and Prospects.

INTRODUCTION

A Balochi word Gwadar is bifurcated into *Gwa* means air, and *Dar* means gate. Its meaning is gate of air (Kalim & Syed, 2020:75). Fishmongers were inhabitants of a hamlet, which is now known as the port city of the district of Gwadar. It can be accessed by Gwadar to Lasbela coastal highway. Gwadar has remained the center of attention in Makran history with its six hundred km unirrigated Dasht & Kulanch valleys and its coastline. The old history of this district goes back to the era of prophet Dawood (AS) when buried to avoid famine. "The known history of Makran goes back to the time of prophet Dawood when people entombed themselves to prevent famine (Bazai, 2014:96). Alexander and his General Seleukos Nikator, one of

Alexander's generals, lost Gwadar to Chandragupta in 303 BC. (Bazai, 2014:96). Under the command of Imad-ud-Dim Mohammad bin Qasim, Muslim seized Gwadar in 711 A.D. (Bhutani, 2019:3). The next aliens after the Muslims were the Portuguese. They attached Gwadar and burnt it in 1581 A.D. (Nicolini, September 2018). In 1783, on the request of King of Muskat, Mir Naseer Khan-I allocated a large sum of revenue from Gwadar to the king of Oman. Later, in 1861, British captured the port and started docking. Balochistan retained paramountcy against internal and external powers. In eighteenth century Balochistan remained the focus of many British writers, especially Charles Masson. A pseudonym being used by James Lewis, a soldier of British East India Company who discovered the ruins of

Harappa in Sahiwal (Afridi, 2012:4). When Muscat become British colony in 1802 AD British signed an agreement declaring Gwadar port as part of Oman. First telegraph line between India and Europe passed through Gwadar in 1868 (Mehdi, et, at, 2009:7) The British systematically divided Balochistan into different parts. The western part was handed over to Iran in 1871 (Goldsmith’s Line); the northern part to Afghanistan in 1893 (Durand Line) ...and the rest was

divided into State of Kalat and three puppet principalities (Siddiqi, 2010: 62).

It has strategic significance in terms of area, access and location. Gwadar district is located from 24°06’N’ to 62°20’1E and cover a total area of 15, 216 km². Gwadar is surrounded by the districts of Kech & Awaran in the north. Lasbela on the east, Arabian Sear on the south and Iran on the west (Sarfray, 1997). In terms of it’s as comparison with the competing Asian ports see table 1, below.

Table 1. Comparison of Gwadar with Asian Ports.

National Ports	Depth in Meter	International Ports	Depth in Meter
Karachi	10	Singapore	21
Qasim	12	Hong Kong	10
Gwadar	18	UAE	16
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Sources: (Ali, Dildar, 2019:23)10.5281/ZENODO.4540944

It is obvious from the above-mentioned figures that Gwadar is the second-deepest port after Port Singapore. After the Karakoram Highway, Gwadar is referred to as the "second great memorial" for Pakistan and China (Dinesh, 2021: 55). A port with high depth has the capacity to dock S-type ships. The importance of this dockland has increased due to its depth and warm water for the seasonal activities of importation and exportation. The port benefits from its proximity to Hormuz and its ability to divert ships. It’s a regional center of communication for the world’s traffic, facilitating outgoing and incoming traffic. Most of the shipping routes connect Asia, Europe, and Africa. It has

been elevated to a commercial and strategic port. (Dr. Raja Mohammad Khan, 2013: 38) The Wind Door (Gwadar) can be developed as Pakistan's economic gateway. It converges the commercial regions and natural resources of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia (Dastagir *et al.*, 2015: 72).

Let’s look at the demographic profile of district Gwadar. The statistics have been provided from the 6th census of 2017. According to the census, the literacy rate is only 25.47%. Socio-economic development is measured with different variables, such as people’s literal, political, infrastructural, and economic well-being. To conclude the population of the area, see Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Population of Gwadar
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.

Why is China investing billions of dollars is the question. The response lies in two factors: the importance of the sea and the relationship among the states. The divine book describes the importance of the sea: "It is He who enables you to travel on land and sea until, when you are in ships, they sail with them by a good" (Al-Quran, 10: 22). Political, social, friendship, and economic similarity with physical proximity play an important role in the second factor. The Gwadar port has dual advantages, i.e., land and sea connectivity, both of which are excellent means of transportation. For a long time, the sea was a center of human activity. It has segregated the states into littoral and landlocked ones. Economic activities dominate around littoral states; the state is bound to manage peaceful and cordial relations with such states. It is costly for China to embark on its voyage from the Gulf States and travel through the Strait of Malacca. Thus, the best option for her is to use CPEC and the Arabian Sea to depreciate its cost and time. As far as state relations are concerned, these are always interest-based.

Lard Parmesan Stone says, "In international relations, there is no such thing as a permanent friend or enemy; preference is given only to the national interest of any given state, which bases its foreign policy on the basis of national security and interest" (Muzaffar *et al.*, 2016: 64). Gwadar and the CPEC are in China's best interests. Sino-Pak relations are forging this interest too. "Gwadar is most likely to be developed by China because Pakistan is probably the only state where the level of trust between the two countries is high enough to make that a completely reliable prospect," according to Mr. Andrews Small (Khan, 2013:95). We may agree with former premier Nawaz Sharif about the development of Gwadar and CPEC: "Our relations are based on the shared ideals and principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, and mutual respect" (BBC, 2015). The contract with the Port Singapore Authority expired, and CPEC was jointly coordinated with China's National Development and Reform Commission and Pakistan's Planning Commission to discharge massive investment. It is based on the Look East and West phenomenon: China is looking west while Pakistan is looking east to boost economic prospects. The project is in the best interest of China because Europe is reviving the old silk route, which is why China wants to expand economic activities and political influence along the western Silk Road (Niaz, A., 2006: 637). It is one of the six BELT and

ROAD initiatives' corridors: OBOR. The investment has exceeded US \$64 billion. The time frame set for the project is 2030, and there is a sign of hope that the investment will embrace more and more in the future. When it was signed first in July 2013, priority was given to the infrastructure, i.e., the central, eastern, and western routes. "If we look at the entire region, it looks like a funnel." The tip of the funnel is this wide area of Central Asia and China's western region. And this funnel gets narrowed through Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the end of this funnel is Gwadar port. "So, this funnel, futuristically, is the economic funnel of this whole region," says General Pervez Musharraf (Malik H, 2012: 57). Let's discuss the prospects of CPEC for Gwadar and Balochistan.

THEORETICAL & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework for this paper is based on realistic conflict theory. The conceptual framework for this is conceptualized here. It is sad but true that resources are scarce because demand for jobs and homes is high. Only one group benefits from the zero-sum outcome, while another suffers (Baron Robert and Branscombe Nyla, R. 2012: 199). The socio-economic conflict among these groups results from competition over the most valuable and scarce resource for them, as explained by the realistic conflict theory (Ibid). Sharif's classical study shows that the most common cause of conflict is the scarcity of resources. There is always competition among groups over resources. One gets, and the others are deprived. The frameworks are suitable for this study. Balochistan is the hub of CPEC activities, and its population is striving for their rights. as Sharif witnessed in his classical study. He formed two groups that competed for the resources. There was tough competition among the competitors. He then changed the condition and established a superordinate goal for both groups. Then he saw both groups collectively participating in the activities for the superordinate goal without hindering one another. The supraordinate goals can only be achieved through cooperation. Thus, the Pakistani government needs to set some superordinate goals to seek provincial and local cooperation for the successful competition and smooth function of the projects. The zero-sum will not be helpful for all. The failure of the public will result in the failure of the projects.

PROSPECTS

Gwadar provides strategic depth for Pakistan Navy and Army. The progress of the state is associated with its

development. It will boost economic assets too (Fawad, 2014). Sixteen projects were proposed for Balochistan. See the list below (table 2).

Table 2. Projects under CPEC for Baluchistan.

PROJECTS			
1. Khuzdar Basima Highway (N-30)	2. Gwadar Technical and Vocational College	3. GwadarNew International Airport	4. Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan
5. Gwadar Nawabshah LNG Terminal and Pipeline	6. Gwadar East Bay Expressway II	7. D.I Khan-Quetta Highway (N-50)	8. Expansion of mutli-Purpose Terminal including Breakwater and Dredging Wastewater
9. Gwadar East Bay Expressway	10. Fresh Water Supply	11. Hubco Coal Power Plant	12. Treatment Plants of Gwadar City
13. Gwadar Hospital Upgradation	14. Gwadar Free Zone.	15. Gwadar Power Plant	16. Gwadar Primary School

Source: (Ministry of Planning) <http://cpec.gov.pk/>

Pakistan ranked 115th out of 137 states because of CPEC developments. The World Economic Forum based this ranking on infrastructural growth. The states under the umbrella of CPEC would develop both backward provinces, i.e., Balochistan and Xinjiang. This move will drive natives to the provinces for economic opportunities. The sweltering issue is climate change, which is deteriorating groundwater and surface water resources. There is hope that water scarcity will be tackled with the help of technical assistance such as desalinization plants and the upgradation of Ankara or Shadi Kor dams. The scarcity of water has forced locals to exodus, and the environment has pushed them to sell off their domestic animals. Durani, Shahzed Aga presided over the Reforms Committee and presented a report on water scarcity in the Gwadar district. The Akra dam has been filled and dried up, as reported. To meet our water requirements and get rid of salinity, a desalinization plant was set up, but its design was faulty, and it got shut down after 47 days (Kawish, 2018: 13). Balochistan will be the hub for people around the globe. More developments require more technicians and increase demand for technical institutes. Baloch people have high expectations of the government in this regard. The developments will ensure counter-spying activities against Indian insurgencies. It will be the hub of regional trade and transportation activities. The province's security is ensured by development assurance. To ward off insurgencies, we need to provide

funds and facilities for the induction and indulgence of the Balochistan Liberation Organization (BLO) into insurgencies. Then, the public will turn hostile toward insurgents. This will also halt local recruitment for non-state activities. Once funds and facilities shift at the grass-roots level, the inhabitants will consider them terrorists and enemies against their development. Pathans and Baloch alike seek work in Sindh and Punjab's urban areas. CPEC will limit opportunities for Balochistan. This move will hamper urbanization because of similar opportunities at home. Being a thinly populated province, Balochistan provides 60% of the energy requirements of densely populated provinces. There are almost 200 coal mines, and Sui gas, discovered in 1952, facilitates Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur. Gwadar, Balochistan, contributes up to 45% of gas production (Sohail *et al.*, 2017: 2). The significance of this region became clear following Russia's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It was dubbed the "Zone of Instability" by American President Richard Nixon (Goraya *et al.*, 2012: 114). It means the stability of this zone will maintain the stability of the region. This is the reason that the center of activities against Russia was Balochistan. Two security zones have been established to protect the Gwadar and CPEC routes directly, as well as the Baloch and Balochistan routes indirectly. The Pakistan Navy has deployed a protection battalion for Chinese security, and a commissioned TF-88 has been stationed at the deep seaport of Gwadar. This task force

(TF-88) carried aerial vehicles, surveillance assets, attack helicopters, and warships (Chohan, 2021: 100).

Balochistan's representation is essential for law and order in CPEC, Gwadar, and Balochistan. The province is fortunate enough to allow CAR, Afghanistan, and Russia to access the Arabian Sea. The province is lucky enough to provide raw material, and other minerals are in abundance in this area. Raw materials will attract industrialization in the province, or the demand for the same can be extended in exchange for promoting the factor market. The purchase and sale of raw materials are known as "factor markets." Thus, the province has a good opportunity to deal with it. This factor market can attract FDI (foreign direct investment). The province is the best market for men and materials. Low-cost labor is readily available. With the construction of the western route of CPEC, property values have skyrocketed in these areas. (Taj, Liang, & Zafar, 2018: 69) The Western and Central CPEC routes would facilitate import and export of the same. According to the report's estimates, the Gwadar economic corridor will contribute up to 2.5% to the country's growth and create up to 700,000 job opportunities between 2015 and 2030 (Fahad S., 2017).

The province can reap numerous benefits because of its strategic location and alignment with landlocked countries. Gwadar achieved the status of the central piece and gate to the Ormuz. It is competitive with the ports of the United Arab Emirates. It has the potential to improve and strengthen ties with the Caspian region. Potentially, it has the capability to emerge as a regional hub for trans-shipment and trans-shipment ports in the future (Malik, 2012: 58). Previously, Central Asian states were not permitted due to the overburdening of two ports in Sindh. Balochistan Port will enable these states to approach the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. With its capacity to lodge S-type ships, it has superseded Chabahar and Dubai ports, whose depth cannot accommodate S-type or heavily loaded ships. It would be a hub between the south-east and south-west economic and factor markets. Gwadar and Chabahar are important and dependable global trade hubs, including maritime organizations (Aslan & Rashid, June 2020: 3). Thus, the province serves as a nucleus for regional import and export. CPEC is not just an economic corridor; it is also an energy corridor. A gas pipeline has already been proposed. The proposed gas pipeline from Pakistan to China via Gwadar to Xinxiang is 2500 km.

The distance of 4500 km is so large between the eastern ports of Beijing and Shanghai (Shabir, 2013:93). Both provinces are situated on opposite sides, one at the head and another at the tail. Terminals will be installed to handle, and process imported oil and gas in China. The oil refinery withheld by China would resume. Iran was also happier to have refineries. Gwadar port also holds importance for Iran. It was decided to build an oil refinery at Gwadar with a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day. During the Pakistan People's Party regime (2008–2013), Iran could not materialize it because of sanctions on her and thus failed to conclude any memorandum of understanding with Pakistan (Bhutta, 2016: 11). Other firms are also ready. For example, Pak-Arab Refinery decided to set up a refinery in the Gwadar province of Balochistan with a capacity of 250,000 barrels per day. Pakistan owns 60% of the company, while the UAE owns 40%. Similar interest was also shown by a Chinese firm named China Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering Corporation (Bhutta, 2016: 11). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would increase the life standard of local communities (Sun *et al.*, 2020: 606). But research studies related to local community living standards and CPEC development are very limited. (Sun *et al.*, 2020: 606).

IMPLICATIONS

Balochis are far behind in terms of lifestyle and socioeconomic conditions. The province of Balochistan provides 40% of electricity, coal, and gas for the country's requirements. Despite being a fully improved natural resource, it has not developed up to the mark (Farooqi & Aftab, 2018: 5). India has been investing to create chaos in Balochistan. Balochistan has been suffering from BLO and inter-provincial ethnic riots. These conflicts are triggered by the rival states' attempts to destabilize Pakistan and disrupt the CPEC project (Zaheer & Asim, 2021: 60). In the article by Muhammad Ali Talpur, he said, "The CPEC project is only for China." It would destroy their lives in the name of development. "The dissenting Baloch consider the CPEC project an injustice to the people of Balochistan and a deprivation to the local Balochs" (Ahmad & Mi, 2017: 5). During the Nawaz Sharif era, there was opposition to the Islamabad government's corridor plans, which showed that most of the resources would be diverted to benefit only Punjab (Ahmad & Mi, 2017: 5). Non-state actors are individuals or groups who

challenge the writ of the state and inflict heavy security issues. On one hand, CPEC and Gwadar are providing security to Balochistan, but on the other, they have increased the threats. If we analyze terrorist attacks in the last decade, we conclude that they were reported from Panjgur, Lasbela, Kech, Gwadar, and Awaran districts of Balochistan on the CPEC route (Sial, 2014: 24). General (R) Pasha claimed that India and the UAE (reportedly due to opposition to the construction of the Gwadar port) were funding and arming the Baloch. He also claimed that the Russian government was directly involved in funding, training, and supporting the insurgency (Imtiaz S., 2010). Gauging the threat from the insecurity quagmire, Mr. Ahmed Mukhtiar demanded, "We are grateful to the Chinese government for constructing Gwadar Port." However, we will be more grateful to the Chinese government if a naval base for Pakistan is built on the Gwadar site" (Makhdoom et al., 2014: 188). Such a demand will help to destroy external agendas. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan and declared independence on August 15, 2021. China had been backing Pakistan in peace talks. Its peace initiative for Afghanistan and announcement to help the newly formed Taliban government are signs of peace in Balochistan. Its initiative for peace in the region indicates that there are security implications because it "is currently the heart of the insurgency" (Boone, J. 2017). Attacks on Chinese engineers and workers portray a dismal picture of security implications. The Chinese President visited Pakistan in 2015 to create a contingent of troops to secure Chinese interest in Gwadar. But "the notion that the two special brigades formed by the army would be enough to protect road traffic was laughable" (Boone, J. 2017). Besides security issues, some real estate cases involving public and private properties also surfaced; for instance, Gwadar's lands have been seized by state agencies, the coast guard, the navy, and the paramilitaries. Every general has a plot in Gwadar. They say these plots were given because this is a federal project. But this is a land grab (Pakistan Report, 2006: 15). PML (N) stifled the port's development in 1992. This decision was welcomed but thwarted during the eight years of the dictator's rule (1992–2007). When construction of Gwadar commenced, the locals weren't made stakeholders. Baloch are concerned about demographic change in the province and the influx of people from other provinces and their negative impacts on

Balochistan. They reiterated that non-Balochi would replace their workforce at Gwadar. They reiterate that people from other provinces have greater access to jobs, contracts, and estates as compared to Baloch people. They are encouraged and provided with firms and sectors to start housing schemes in Gwadar. These initiatives will result in a demographic imbalance in the district and especially in the province (Pakistan Report, 2006: 15). Baloch view Gwadar in comparison to Karachi port when Sindhi people were marginalized into a minority by the induction of other communities, particularly by the federal government through bureaucrats and another high official (Ali, Dildar, 2019: 81). They fear that Chinese and skilled labor from the rest of the provinces will deprive them of their right to Gwadar. Its skilled labor won't be able to compete in hiring, testing, and examining. However, Balochistan's unskilled labor will have opportunities in comparison to the rest of the provinces' unskilled labor. Its labor is cheap in terms of accommodation and daily wages. Another implication for Gwadar is the extraction of resources. Balochistan is rich in natural resources. Sui gas was discovered in 1951 and provides gas to other provinces. Baloch fear that their other resources, like gas, will be extracted from Balochistan without giving any benefit to the local inhabitants. A report says, "Baloch nationalists, however, believe this road-building project is aimed at easier extraction of Balochistan's natural resources and to enable the Pakistan army and security agencies to expand their control over the province." (Pakistan Report, 2006: 15) To thwart any attempt and plot by the insurgents, the governments decided to construct Eastern route. This eastern route will strengthen the quick mobilization of troops, men, and materials for both trade and security purposes. Operation Zarb-i-Azab started for security purposes. Mercantilists focus on strengthening domestic producers and local industries. Pakistan is not good enough to export. The goods and commodities imported through CPEC routes will have adverse impacts on our local industries. It will tighten the grip over such producers, and as a result, the progress of exports will be hampered. Pakistani markets would not be able to compete (as we are already losing in terms of trade). Hence, Pakistani businesses need to be very competitive to take full advantage of CPEC. (Pakistan Report, 2006:18) China can assist Pakistan in maximizing its potential in the investment sector and exporting gems

to China. because China is the world's largest consumer of gemstones and consumer markets (Tribune, Express, August 6, 2014: 10) China is the second-largest economy in the world, while India claimed in 2019 to surpass the United Kingdom and France in Gross Domestic Product (Hosain, 2020: 113).

SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF BALOCHISTAN AND ENERGY CRISIS

These ferrymen of Gwadar are famous for fishing in the Arabian Sea. They are not literate, and they are required to produce fishing degrees. The main cause of the draught in the district is shortage of rain, otherwise, Akora dam is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the people and growing population. Agha Shahzeb Durani presided over the Reforms Committee and presented a report. The report was about the scarcity of water in the district Gwadar. The report indicated that the dam mentioned above has dried up and filled with silt and sand. It was constructed to desalinate sea water. The design of the desalination plant was faulty and couldn't function even after successful installation. The water is sold in the district costly (Kawish, 2018: 13). Up to 12 million gallons per day (MGD), the demand and requirement of the water would increase. The current demand of the district is 4.6 MGD. The total requirement of 2.888 MGD has been filled by the Ankara Kaur dam. A 2.0 MGS Desalination plant is under construction. Without resolving the reservation of the locals (Baloch) no project would function properly. The 18th amendment of 2010 has granted more autonomy to the province. Under this amendment. Dr. Abdul Malik requested the federal government to hand over the Gwadar to the government of Balochistan. Balochistan is the hub of CPEC. Two out of three routes pass through Balochistan. Thus, Baloch should first harvest the benefits of CPEC and Gwadar. The provincial government was not taken on board when Gwadar was handed over to the Port Singapore Authority. "The corridor passes through what is currently the heart of the insurgency, says Kaiser Bengali, an economic adviser to Balochistan's chief minister. He said, "the notion that the two special brigades formed by the army will be enough to protect road traffic was "laughable" (Boone, J. (2017). The lack of educational opportunities and institutions is another of discomfort among the inhabitants. This project was first projected at the time.

of presidency of General Pervez Musharraf. It had been an essential during his era when institutions could have been set up (Zaheer & Asim, 2021: 60). The insurgency and segregationist activities can only be curbed by means of education. Besides signing free trade agreement (FTA) with Chinese government he could have focused on education too. CPEC contributed 10,400 MW additionally and 2% per annum the energy crisis reduced. Other project of hydro, solar and wind project worth of \$15.5 bn would also come in future. The energy cooperation signed on November 8, 2014. 61% will be investment in energy to improve transmission. The dearth of energy has declined our Gross Domestic Products to 2% per annum. The energy cooperation will increase our purchasing power and contribute to the reduction of cost price of domestic goods and services. China and Pakistan have physical contacts and economic zones under CPEC will boost the contact. CPEC is undertaken by the Energy Planning Working Group to make the implementation very quick and smooth. Moreover, Under CPEC, projects of 21,690 MW will also be undertaken with Chinese cooperation (Waqar, 2014). Pakistan has capacity of 50% production and this capacity can't satisfy export of Pakistan. The power and energy crisis are main hurdles in export efficiency. The production capacity of Pakistan is 24,830 MW still there is dearth of 4,500 MW. This shortage of 4,500 MW is decreasing our GDP by 2%. Nandipur power project and Diamer Bhasha dam are part and parcel of energy cooperation (Rizvi, 2014: 10). The proposed 2500 km long pipeline of gas to be built from Xinjiang to Gwadar via Pakistan. The distance between the port of Shanghai and Beijing to Xinjiang is 4500 km (Khan, 2013: 93). To import gas through Iran Pakistan gas pipeline Gwadar terminal will be set up to benefit Pakistan government in the sector of energy. Iran Pakistan gas pipeline has been waiting for CPEC assistance. This investment in Gwadar and Iran gas pipeline to Kashgar will generate transit revenue and open job opportunities. It will be easing energy crisis of Pakistan (Khan, 2013: 90). China is also looking towards Afghanistan for more economic corridors ahead and security of CPEC. Afghan Taliban took over Kabul on 15 August 2021, they have set up government with the Hanafi school of thought. Afghanistan has come out of crisis after 20 years war on terror since September 11, 2001.

CONCLUSION

The overall objective of this study was to highlight Baloch reservation, implications for Gwadar and provide solutions. As the local should benefit based on issues they are facing because they are the stakeholders. After Taliban take over, China came forward to assist because China wants to give more security to CPEC and Gwadar. It will help Afghanistan to export its resources. The sweltering issue is water resources and climate change deteriorating. It will impact on the local market but will bring Pakistan's export and import to some new heights. It will infuse a new impetus in their lives in the form illiteracy to literacy, unemployment to employment, nonmetallic to metallic roads, and harsh and hard travel to easy access.

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