




Available Online at ESci Journals

# Journal of South Asian Studies

ISSN: 2307-4000 (Online), 2308-7846 (Print)  
<http://www.escijournals.net/JSAS>



## IMPACT OF INDIA-UNITED STATES CIVIL NUCLEAR DEAL ON CHINA-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Mehmood Hussain\*

*School of International & Public Affairs, Jilin University, Changchun City, Jilin Province, China.*

### ABSTRACT

India-United States entered into strategic partnership with visit of United States (U.S.) President Bill Clinton to India in 2000. It was U.S. utmost desire to involve India to contain China's rising influence in the region through active strategic partnership. Thus determining factor behind India-U.S. strategic partnership was to restrain rising Chinese power. The year of 2005 marked new era of Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, when the United States President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh signed a civil nuclear deal on 18th July 2005. This deal considers destabilizing existing balance of power within South Asia. Consequently both friendly states perceive Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal as major threat to their security environment. The aim of this paper is to shed light on Pakistan-China's response to Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal and following queries broadly discuss in following sections. What are the impacts of India-United States civil nuclear deal on China-Pakistan relations? Did India-U.S. civil nuclear deal was determining factor behind China-Pakistan strategic partnership? How China-Pakistan respond to India-United States civil nuclear deal? Author argued that Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal posed grave consequences on China-Pakistan security apparatus, and both countries shifted their relations from fairly normal to strategic partnership. Author use balance of Threat theory proposed by Stephen M. Walt to examine level of threat for China-Pakistan security and to explore strategic partnership. Findings of this paper exposed that China-Pakistan paid considerable attention to Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal and entered in several military and nuclear agreements. Besides China's nuclear and military assistance to Pakistan, it also shifted its tilt to pro-Pakistan position on Kashmir dispute and saved Pakistan from international isolation in U.N General Assembly by veto of Indo-U.S. sponsored resolutions to declare Pakistani led organizations.

**Keywords:** Balance of Threat, China-Pakistan, India-U.S. civil nuclear deal, Strategic Partnership.

### INTRODUCTION

The era of new strategic partnership began between India-U.S. on March 2, 2006, when President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh entered in civil nuclear deal. It is also called '123 act' because Washington amend its 1954 nuclear act which enables U.S to transfer nuclear fuel and technology to non-signatory NPT state. In this case it is India. U.S reversed its three decades long nonproliferation policy which was adopted aftermath of 1974 Indian nuclear explosive. When U.S tighten its nuclear export controls through international regimes including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR). But now as a result of civil nuclear agreement, India would have access to U.S nuclear fuel and technology. To secure new relationship with India, U.S President Bush promised to work with Congress to adopt necessary changes in existing U.S laws; and also work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to grant access to civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. Hence, New Delhi agreed to place 14 out of its 22 nuclear reactors under the IAEA inspection regime by 2014 (Kamath, Civilian Nuclear Deal: Turning Points in Indo-U.S Relations, 2006).

Against the backdrop of the Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal, a lot of work has been done in favor and opposition of deal. Many scholars argued that why U.S decided to

\* Corresponding Author:

Email ID: mhussain328@gmail.com

© 2017 ESci Journals Publishing. All rights reserved.

transfer nuclear fuel and technology to India? And what were the U.S stakes behind civil nuclear deal? To answer these questions Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued that, India is the biggest market and nuclear technology is indispensable to accomplish its developmental goals. U.S decided to earn financial gains through transfer of nuclear technology. She testify to congress on April 5, 2006 that U.S keep in mind for private sector during the deal with India. She cited that U.S would earn \$13 billion through civil nuclear deal and building aircraft manufacturer Boeing and reactor sales to India. She also highlighted Indian defense market, which she believes a motivational factor behind the deal (Milholin, 2006).

The George W. Bush administration perceived rising China as potential threat to its hegemony and consider India as a potential balancer in international system. It is "more than a relationship between two great nations. It is the case for institutionalizing a certain kind of international order, what President Bush has called a balance of power that favors freedom". Critics on Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal pointed out that India has scarcity of uranium resources which are important source for civilian reactors as well as nuclear weapons programme. Through the deal India would able to get enriched uranium from U.S for nuclear energy while capable to divert its limited indigenous uranium for nuclear weapons programme. Other opponents argued that Indian nuclear weapons are based on reactor grade plutonium and it is possible for India to retain large stock of plutonium in the civilian list (Kamath, *Civilian Nuclear Deal: Turning Points in Indo-U.S Relations*, 2006). The leading Indian newspaper 'The Hindu' wrote that deal would enhance India's qualitative and quantitative nuclear arsenal and according to former Indian Intelligence official "The assurance of nuclear fuel supply from the US and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will free India's existing capacity to produce enriched uranium and plutonium for its nuclear weapons program. The deal accelerated India's ability to produce 50 nuclear warheads a year, which are far exceeding numbers from its current capacity (*Hindu*, 2006).

The U.S nuclear accord with India should affirm Washington's strategic gains. By removing barrier to nuclear technology for India, agreement is intended to lay down foundations for greater strategic partnership. After the deal, Washington secured a strategic partner in

Asia and beyond, because Washington's interests lies down to balance rising China through stronger partnership with New Delhi. The Bush foreign policymakers were concerned about growing Chinese security threats through its ambitions for super power status, dashing economic power and territorial policies in the Far and Asia Pacific as a whole. The U.S secretary of state Colin Powell confirmed strategic partnership with India rather than China. Powel said that China cannot become strategic partner rather than potential regional rival. Thus it is confirmed by U.S. officials that during any conflict in near future with China, India will share intelligence information about Chinese military capabilities, particularly in the Indian Ocean and its littoral states. The viable strategic partnership has been seen after the 2004 Asian tsunami, when India joined relief efforts with U.S Navy from Sri Lanka to Indonesia (Ganguly, 2006).

India has capacity to assemble 45 to 95 nuclear devices on short notice and Pakistan can hit by its short range Prithvi missile and China's major cities are under direct attack on its medium range Agni missiles. The U.S. civil nuclear deal with India will start new era of nuclearization in Asia and China-Pakistan feel greater threat to their security environment. Similarly deal disturbed existing balance of power in South Asian region. To counter Indo-U.S nexus, China-Pakistan shifted their relations from fairly normal condition to strategic partnership and concluded various agreements from military to nuclear cooperation. New strategic partnership between China-Pakistan will able to maintain existing balance of power and provide key to peace in South Asia (Thomas, 2006).

#### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

'Stephen M. Walt' contributed into existing scholarly literature on balance of power theory with his famous theory 'Balance of Threat'. He proposed new concept in his famous book "The origins of alliances" in 1987. Mainly he provided new lens to explain behavior of states to balance the power in international system. Earlier 'Balance of Power' theory was proposed by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz argued that, states form alliances primarily to balance against powerful rivals. Whereas Stephen M. Walt argued that "states form alliances primarily to balance against threats. Threats, in turn, are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions" (Walt, 1987). He proposed four propositions to explain behavior of states.

In our case study we chose 'Balance of Threat' framework to explain India-U.S. civil nuclear deal and its impacts on China-Pakistan security milieu. China-Pakistan perceived Indo-U.S nuclear deal as a threatening factor to their security apparatus and formed new strategic partnership. Because both states shared border disputes with India which is the major factor behind enmity between three nuclear states. Whereas during the post 9/11 period, United States posed greater threat to China's security environment through its presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Based on historical relationship with Pakistan, China considers indispensable importance of its all-weather friend Pakistan to counter Indo-U.S nexus. Thus both states accelerated efforts to intensify their partnership in various arenas including; military, nuclear, diplomatic and economic and investment fields. Thus balance of threat theory better explains the relationship of China-Pakistan after Indo-United States nuclear deal. To get enriched knowledge about theoretical framework and its propositions below we draw a sketch. See Figure 1 for threat perception;



Figure 1. Threat Perception and its factors

The balance of threat theory stands on four basic propositions. First is aggregate power and India's aggregate power has substantially increased after Indo-U.S. strategic partnership and particularly after civil nuclear deal. U.S poured large accounts of military and economic assistance to India which has increased Indian military and technological capabilities. Secondly India shares territorial disputes with China and Pakistan which is major hurdle to achieve perpetual peace in the region. These territorial disputes are driving force behind animosity between India-Pakistan and China

Source: Drawn by the author.

since their very inception in 1947 and 1949 respectively. Third offensive power has been increased after Indo-U.S strategic partnership and nuclear deal. Tensions had been seen on Indo-Pak and Sino-India border after the nuclear deal. Indian military forces attained sophisticated weaponry equipment's from U.S which augmented Indian pre-emptive attack and counter attack capabilities. Fourthly, aggressive intentions revealed after Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal, when India threatens Pakistan for attack after Mumbai attacks and deployed its military forces along Indo-Pak border.

Whereas on Sino-India border intrusions consistently increased after the deal. So keeping in mind these Indian acts, China-Pakistan decided to counter Indo-U.S nexus and transformed their friendship into strategic partnership.

#### **UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP**

The India-U.S. strategic ties have been on upward trend after U.S President Bill Clinton's landmark visit to India in March 2000. Since then, there has been no downward movement between both states. The predecessor of Clinton, President George W. Bush was not only determined to continue upward trend but gave new strategic importance to New Delhi. In 2001, India designated as a "Friendly Foreign Country" (FFC) by the Secretary of Defense. Besides, in next step for strategic partnership (NSSP), U.S President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed to expand strategic partnership. In January 2004, President Bush agreed to cooperate with India in four broader areas including; civilian space programme, dual use technology, missile defense and civilian nuclear energy (Pinto, 2012). Consequently, both countries have short term interests and long term objectives behind their strategic partnership. In short term objectives, Indo-U.S agreed to cooperate on counter terrorism efforts, combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While in longer term perspective, economies of India, China and Japan are growing at a sharp pace and will be among in five largest economies by mid-century. The rise of Asian economies posed major challenge to U.S. interests in Asia pacific. China's growing economic clout and political influence is a complicated and dynamic element in changing international environment. At the same time tensions between U.S-Russia relations reveals structural limitations. This scenario added uncertainty in security environment of Asia in coming decades. In this larger picture of international system, U.S has sought India to put in its pendulum, based on shared U.S. liberal democratic values including liberal democracy, market economy with secular and pluralistic society.

The strategic partnership with U.S would have generous fruits for India in coming decades. India would get easy access to global knowledge and technology hub through U.S influence. Moreover, India has heavily invested in knowledge generating institutions, universities, and other high technology areas. In past, India has hampered to get access in international knowledge and technology market due to restrictions on high technology dual use

items and munitions technologies through four multilateral export control regimes including; NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group), the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), the Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. Historically U.S played decisive role in development of these export control regimes. But after closer Indo-U.S. relationship, particularly with conclusion of civil nuclear deal, India emerge as full technological power. India will be able to exploit its technological capabilities in space and biotechnology sciences by entering technology control agreements. The ISRO and NASA signed a memorandum of Understanding MOU) at ISRO Satellite Center (ISAC), Bangalore in May 2006. The MoU comply NASA to provide two U.S. scientific instruments for India's first unmanned scientific mission to Moon (Balachandran, 2008).

The year of January 2004 is hall mark of India-U.S. strategic partnership, when two states formally signed a pact of strategic partnership. U.S officials explained that the purpose of accord is to help India to become a major world power in 21<sup>st</sup> century. They further explained that we fully understand the implications of strategic pact, including military implications. To further intensify strategic partnership, on June 28 2005, India-United States signed a defense pact to deepen military cooperation. United States official Robert Blackwill explained that "U.S wants to check Indian missile capability that could lead to China's permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India" (Ramana Z. M.-M., 2006). Punit Saurabh confirmed strategic partnership between India-U.S. by stating that, from past 15 years United States took unprecedented measures to close the gap with India. United States military equipment's sales to India exceeds worth of \$12 billion within past 12 years. Similarly high ranking government officials occasionally paid reciprocated visits to each other's country for deepening relations. United States defense secretary Carter's visit to India was a part of this strategy. During his visit he went to strategically significant Vishakhapatnam which is home base for Indian upcoming Vikrant carrier. The Vikrant carrier is the testimony of the growing strategic partnership between two nations (Saurabh, 2015).

Civil nuclear cooperation is main charisma of Indo-United States strategic partnership, which has been discussed since 2002. United States desire to expand its cooperation with India in nuclear technology to increase

its missile capability and to meet its energy needs. United States President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh were deliberately enthusiastic to nuclear cooperation during their tenure, and consequently on March 2, 2006 civil nuclear deal was signed between two heads of states (Ramana Z. M.-M., 2006). When critics emerged against civil nuclear deal, U.S ambassador to India, Robert B explained Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. He stated that it was impossible without China factor and Bush administration as well as U.S. Congress was not interested to negotiate civil nuclear deal with India without China's rising military and economic clout. It is testified that only energy needs were not motivational factors but China threat was also determining factor (Bano, 2015). Besides civil nuclear deal, military cooperation is another factor behind India-United States deepen strategic partnership. U.S. transferred state of the art military equipment's to India and both armies conducted joint military exercises for more than 50 times since 2002 (Curtis, 2008).

#### **PAKISTAN-CHINA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP**

Pakistan-China began official diplomatic relations on May 21<sup>st</sup> 1951. During post-cold war era, India started rapprochement with China, which severely affected China-Pakistan relations. But September 11, terrorist attacks on United States changed the geo politics of South Asia and Pakistan once again became front line state against war on terror. This changed scenario and United States presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia posed grave consequences on China's security situation. The changing landscape of security milieu in South Asia once again augmented Pakistan's geo strategic significance for Chinese foreign policy makers. A Chinese analyst noted that United States and India have commonality of regarding China as a potential threat and main rival. Both states have common interests to limit rise of China. Against this backdrop, China once again emphasized to strengthen its friendship with its all-weather and time tested friend Pakistan (Siddiqui J. Y.-R., 2011).

Furthermore, entente cordial relationship transformed into an open alliance when on January 4, 2006 China-Pakistan officially signed "The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations". Article 5 of the treaty bind both states to cooperate within a bilateral and multilateral framework. Besides this, the treaty prevents each state to join any alliance or block, which will harm the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of any signatory. This treaty provides a common platform for both nations to strengthen their relations in diverse fields including; military, economy, trade, infrastructure, and nuclear technology transfers (Rehman, 2009). The strategic partnership brought considerable gains for both China and Pakistan. For Pakistan, it provided wide-ranging opportunities to acquire military and nuclear technology. Besides this, China also provided its diplomatic umbrella to Pakistan, when India and United States brought bids in UN Security Council to declare Pakistan as sponsor of terrorist organizations. While strategic partnership bless China with considerable gains. Pakistan handed over its deep water Gawadar port to China for forty years. Through the Gawadar port, China should have access in Indian Ocean and can use as watchdog to monitor Indian and U.S naval activities in Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Gawadar port would also provide shortest overland route to China for its energy supplies. Furthermore, Pakistan provided comprehensive support to China to bring down Uyghur terrorists, who were major force behind destabilizing security situation in Xinjiang Province. In next sections of our paper we briefly discuss areas of cooperation under framework of China-Pakistan strategic partnership.

#### **KASHMIR ISSUE**

Kashmir issue is conflict center between India and Pakistan since their inception in 1947. Kashmir is an uncompleted agenda of Indian sub-Continent partition plan. There were nearly 526 princely states in United India. Kashmir was largest Muslim majority state with Hindu ruler. Based on religious, demographic and geographic proximity, Kashmir was bound to accede with Pakistan, but India occupied Kashmir valley. Pakistan used various platforms to resolve dispute but met with fruitless results due to Indian irredentist behavior. Resultantly both Pakistan and India fought three major wars and a limited conflict over Kargil in 1999. Based on common interests of both states, China adopted pro-Pakistan policy over Kashmir issue after the Indo-China war in 1962. During the cold war period China continuously vowed its voice along with Pakistan. But the disintegration of Soviet Union and end of cold war, Pakistan lost its geo strategic importance in the eyes of Chinese foreign policy makers. While on the other hand, India started rapprochement with China. Thus India-China rapprochement seriously effects on China-Pakistan entente. After Indian request, China

adopted neutral position over Kashmir issue. This neutrality can be seen in Indo-Pakistan Kargil conflict in 1999, when China urged both states to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogues and reluctant to display pro-Pakistan tilt. Economic gains were behind China's new rhetoric. Because India is largest market and Chinese export oriented economy was the largest beneficiary of India's open up approach (Singh S. , 2008). Indo-China relations improved in economic and trade affairs but territorial disputes are major constraints in improvement of bilateral relations. Similarly, India-United States civil nuclear deal of 2005 resonate the threat for regional security and balance of power. India-United States strategic partnership posed serious implications on resolution of Kashmir issue, because India gained U.S support and military weaponry. To reassure of its backing on Kashmir issue, China once again drifted back its policy on Kashmir along with Pakistani side. China declared Kashmir as a core issue between India-Pakistan. And China argued that without resolution of Kashmir issue it is impossible to obtain perpetual peace in South Asia (Singh P. K., 2010).

#### **STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF GAWADAR PORT FOR CHINA**

As Chinese economy is rising at very sharp pace since last three decades and in 2010 China surpassed U.S. as the biggest energy consumer. China is importing its 85 percent oil and natural gas needs from Persian Gulf and Africa and it passed through Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait is vulnerable to U.S. Navy and sea pirates. This is what Chinese President Hu Jintao refers it to as China's "Malacca Dilemma" because adversaries can interrupt its energy supplies. To mitigate this dilemma, China has taken two steps, first China has increased its naval presence in Indian Ocean region and second China started to develop overland trade and energy corridors through Central to South Asia. Gawadar port is one point of Chinese grand strategy to build overland trade and energy routes (Beckley, 2012).

Pakistan officially announced to build Gawadar Port in 2001 and China vocally announced for economic and technical assistance for construction of first phase. First phase of Gawadar port was completed with total cost of \$248 million and China provided \$198 million out of \$248. Besides economic assistance China extend technical assistance during construction phase. Finally, total Chinese investment reached \$1.6 billion for the construction of Gawadar port (Kabaraji, The China-

Pakistan Alliance: Rhetoric and Limitations, 2012). The Port of Gawadar is strategically most important for China because it provides foothold for Chinese Navy in Indian Ocean and it can be used to monitor U.S and Indian naval activities. Many analysts describe Gawadar port as one part of China's "String of pearls" strategy. Moreover Gawadar port will connect Pakistan with China's province of Xinjiang with a network of roads, railways, energy and gas pipeline with total length of nearly 3,000 kilometers. This overland route will shorten distance between China and Persian Gulf and will reduce energy imports expenses. To materialize new framework, Pakistan-China began to upgrade Karakorum Highway (KKH) which will able to use for whole year after upgradation. The up gradation process consist widening of existing roads, buildup of new tunnels and bridges. The up gradation cost consist \$795 million and China provided large share with technical assistance.

Besides, the diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and China, military and nuclear cooperation always remain enduring pillar of cordial relationship between two states. But during the post-cold war era, China-Pakistan intensified economic and trade cooperation. Intensification of economic relations, two-way trade was less than \$ 1 billion in 1998. But in 2002, bilateral trade reached nearly \$2.4 billion. Later in 2007, it further surpassed nearly \$7 billion. Finally, in 2011 bilateral trade reached up to \$10.6 billion between two countries. China believes that substantial increase in trade and investment in Pakistan can minimize separatist sentiments in its most volatile Uyghur Autonomous Xinjiang region. China believes that economic development inside Pakistan will have positive spillover on Xinjaing region and would mitigate violence and unrest (Hartpence, The Economic Dimension of Sino-Pakistan Relations:An Overview, 2011).

#### **MILITARY COOPERATION**

The defense and nuclear cooperation is enduring pillar of Sino-Pakistan friendship. Sino-Pakistan military cooperation dates back to 1965, when U.S put an arms embargo on Pakistan during Indo-Pak war. At that time of crisis, China stepped forward and replaced U.S for the arms supply to Pakistan. In 1966, Pakistan received Chinese military weapons including; F-6 fighter jets, T-59 tanks and anti-aircraft guns worth of \$250 million. China's military sales played significant role in augmenting Pakistan's military capabilities (Faruqui,

2013). Similarly during 1966-1971, China provided military weapons and equipment's to Pakistan worth of \$133 million. And between 1978 and 2008, Pakistan received military equipment's estimated \$7 billion from China. For intensification of military cooperation and self-reliance, in September 2003 Pakistan started joint venture production of JF-17 fighter aircraft with Chinese economic and technical assistance. Assembling of JF-17 fighter took four years and in 2007 fighter jet take off its first test flight in a ground breaking ceremony. The JF-17 fighter jet provided an alternative to Pakistan Airforce for U.S made F-16 fighter jets. Inclusion of new Jets in PAF will enhance air superiority of Pakistan. Therefore China believes that militarily strong and confident Pakistan is important to engage India on two front war (Ahmad, 2013).

China is not partner like other western states namely United States. United States always used stick and carrot policy towards Pakistan. Whereas China is time tested and all-weather friend and ally of Pakistan, and it adopted various approaches towards Pakistan for military cooperation. China paid indispensable attention to Pakistan's self-reliance and started various joint venture programs. Pakistan Wah Factory and heavy mechanical complex at Taxila are only two examples of China's military and technology collaboration with Pakistan (Haq, 2011). With the passage of time, Pakistan expands its indigenous military production program and two above mentioned military complexes are able to fulfil weapons and equipment procurement for Pakistan military. Similarly Beijing always provided sophisticated weapon system to Pakistan and agreed to deliver 36 CAC J-10 multipurpose fighter aircrafts to Pakistan. Both countries have also collaboration on different joint ventures such as K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, Al Khalid tanks, Babur cruise missiles, and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) (Xiaokun, 2010).

Besides this, Navies of both countries are working closely with each other. In April 2006, two countries signed a deal to build 4 F-22P frigates worth of \$750 million. Three have been delivered to Pakistan since 2009 and the last was provided in 2013. The upgradation of Karachi dockyard, modernization of Pakistan's surface fleet and transfer of technology was

also part of the deal (Akhtar, 2014). Moreover from 2007 to 2011, China transfers 64% of its military exports to Pakistan including 50 JF-11 aircraft, 2F-22P frigates (Zulfiqar) and 203 MBT (Al-Khalid) tanks. (Smith, 2013) In 2009 US office of Secretary of State submitted annual report to Congress. The office identified in report that China recently sold conventional weapons and related manufacturing capability to Pakistan, including JF-17 fighter jets and production facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 Jets for training, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms and ammunition.

In 2008, China-Pakistan signed a deal of \$278 million for four Chinese KJ-2000/ZDK03 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. And in early 2011, Pakistan-China formally began to construct of two state of the art fast track missile crafts for the Pakistan Navy, which would enhance naval capabilities. China's interests to modernize Pakistan navy lies in grand strategy of China's naval power. China believes that Pakistan navy will defend Chinese interests in Indian Ocean and will provide naval bases to observe U.S. and Indian naval activities (Rakisits, 2012). Whereas, in May 2011, U.S. Navy sales raid in Abbottabad on intelligence information. They killed most wanted Osama bin Laden in an attack and, the U.S attack was an open violation of Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity Pakistan was much desperate and was feeling defenseless. At that difficult time, China came forward and vociferously condemned U.S. action. Soon after attack, China transferred 50 JF-17 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan. These fighter jets are capable to carry nuclear weapons and increased PAF war strength (Kabaraji, The China-Pakistan Alliance: Rhetoric and Limitations, 2012). China is major arms supplier to Pakistan since 1965. In recent years China replaced U.S as largest conventional arms exporter to Pakistan. Statistics revealed that before India-U.S nuclear deal, China transfers arms worth of \$1174 million to Pakistan, but it exceeds three time during post Indo-U.S nuclear deal. Pakistan received arms from China worth of \$4944 million during 2007 to 2015 which shows that China accelerated its efforts to provide sophisticated weaponry system to Pakistan, which would have considerable benefits to enhance military capability.

China's Conventional Arms exports to Pakistan from 2000-2015.

Year	Amount \$ Million	Year	Amount \$ Million
Pre-Indo-U.S Nuclear Deal		Post Indo-U.S Nuclear Deal	
2000	69	2007	144
2001	299	2008	250
2002	286	2009	796
2003	267	2010	766
2004	77	2011	578
2005	78	2012	657
2006	98	2013	794
		2014	394
		2015	565
<b>Total</b>	<b>1174</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>4944</b>

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.

Joint military exercises have cornerstone importance in China-Pakistan military cooperation. The joint exercises are means to understand war tactics of two armies. After 2001, China-Pakistan intensify collaboration of military exercises and intelligence sharing. Pakistan-China conducted joint military exercises in the year 2006 and 2010 to enhance warfare dealings. Later in 2011, militaries of both countries were united in another exercise, namely Youyi-iv (Translating into Friendship). Joint military exercises are the primary source to deepen military collaboration and understanding between military personals. Pakistan army learned guerrilla warfare and other tactical operations from Chinese military counterparts. (Hartpence, *The Economic Dimension of Sino-Pakistan Relations: An Overview*, 2011).

**DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT**

China has increased its diplomatic support for Pakistan on many crucial issues including; Kashmir, cross border terrorism, drone attacks, and U.S attack in Abbottabad. This diplomatic support reveals strong strategic partnership between two friendly nations. During the post 9/11 period, when United States declared several organizations as international terrorist groups. Pakistani organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jammāt -ud-Dawawere also among them. First time in April 2006, India-United States brought a bid in UN Security Council to declare Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jammātud Dawa as international terrorist groups. But China used its veto power and blocked bids on Pakistani request. Later again in May 2007, China blocked Indo-US proposal in United Nations Security Council for putting sanctions on Pakistani led organizations (Siddiqui, 2014). In November 2008, terrorist attack took place on Taj Hotel Mumbai, India and immediately after attacks, Indian

government blamed that Pakistan had backed behind perpetrators. Against this backdrop, India submitted resolution 1267 in United Nations Security Council to declare Jammāt-ud-Dawa as an international terrorist outfit. But China follow its suit to reject vague Indian initiative by veto power and saved Pakistan from humiliation. China always proved that it is time tested and all-weather friend of Pakistan and extend its umbrella to save Pakistan from international community pressure (Small, *China's Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan*, 2010).

The leadership of China openly support Pakistan on various international platforms. May 2011 U.S. Navy sales attack proved that Chinese leadership paid considerable attention to Pakistan’s legitimate standings. China strongly condemned U.S violations and Premier Wen Jiabao stated that “Pakistan has made huge sacrifices and an important contribution to the international fight against terrorism, that its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be respected, and that the international community should understand and support Pakistan’s efforts to maintain domestic stability and to realize economic and social development” (Pant, 2012).

**NUCLEAR COOPERATION**

Indo-United States civil nuclear deal signed on March 2, 2006. Many factors were behind Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal but major factor was U.S motive to contain rising China through strong strategic partnership with India. China expressed its opposition to Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal and state mouth People’s daily wrote on 27<sup>th</sup> October 2005 that United States actions for making nuclear deal with India is violation of nuclear nonproliferation norms and argued that “United States always called itself a guard for nuclear nonproliferation



and condemned other countries for proliferation activities. But now it did not hesitate to revise the laws for taking exceptions for India" (Kalis, 2015). The nuclear deal would enable India to improve its qualitative and quantitative nuclear arsenal and India's indigenous uranium reserves would be free after U.S uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply. India agreed to open up its 14 reactors out of 22 for IAEA inspections. The remaining eight are able to produce enough fissile material for nuclear weapons. In his testimony to Indian Parliament on March 7, PM Singh stated that "there will be no capping of our strategic program, and the separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and future requirements of our strategic program, based on our assessment of the threat scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes" (Prime Minister's Suo Motu Statement on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the US: Implementation of India's Separation Plan, 2006).

China's motives drive behind the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan about the regional balance of power and are a part to contain India on two front during a conflict with either country (Paul, 2003). China-Pakistan views that India-U.S civil nuclear deal would disturb conventional and nuclear balance of power in the region. The nuclear deal would improve Indian capability for pre-emptive attack on Pakistan, because it gave green signal to India's nuclear programme, raisings its status to recognized nuclear power (Khan, 2013). By improving India's nuclear status through nuclear deal, it could trigger arms race in South Asian countries including; India, Pakistan and possibly China. U.S have its own interests to make India global or at least regional power behind the deal. It could force major states to re-evaluate their security systems and also trigger to transform regional balance of power structure (Muhammad, 2006).

Andrew Small argued that China was opposed for the exemptions to India in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). He stated that Beijing understands ambitions of India-U.S nuclear deal, that U.S and India make alliance to contain China. While China had a solution in its hand for their intentions. If United States approach to India has been one of de-hyphenation from Pakistan, China has been one of re-hyphenation (Small, *The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics*, 2013). This India-U.S civil nuclear deal posed grave consequences on China-

Pakistan territorial integrity because India would have been divert its domestic enriched uranium for nuclear weapons development which can hamper the security of two neighborly states. China believes that a credible and confident Pakistan is most important player to maintain regional balance and peace. To counter the deal and to achieve balancing goals, in 2010 both China-Pakistan signed an agreement to build two more 300 megawatt reactors namely Chashma III and IV at Chashma complex. These reactors will generate nuclear energy which will end Pakistan's endemic energy shortfalls. Furthermore, Pakistan would also have access to Chinese nuclear fuel and technology, which will boost Pakistan's nuclear programme. In March 2013, media reported that China-Pakistan enters in a new agreement to build one 1000 MW power plant at Chashma Complex. It is first time that China exported its ACP-1000 pressurized water reactor (PWR). This new reactor is capable to generate 1,000 MW electricity. Regardless its civilian nature, Islamabad's partnership with Beijing helps to counterbalance Indo-U.S nuclear deal. Because after the announcement of Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal, China-Pakistan entered in agreements to build three nuclear reactors (Power Loop, China Provides Nuclear Reactors to Pakistan, 2014

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took his office after winning general elections in May 2013. During election campaign he promised nation to end endemic energy shortfalls, and based on his promise he was elected. Soon after taking control in Prime Minister Office, he expressed his great enthusiasm to solve energy crisis. He paid special attention to China-Pakistan nuclear ties. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accelerated his efforts to engage China to expand nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. 'Saeed Shah' wrote in Wall street Journal that, China-Pakistan announced to build two 1100 megawatt each nuclear reactors in Karachi. Authorities estimated total cost of \$9.59 billion for the construction of these two reactors. And China promised to grant a loan of \$6.5 billion to finance this project (Shah, 2014). Evident revealed that construction of civil nuclear reactors in Pakistan is response of Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal. Both China-Pakistan signed various agreements to build 5 civil nuclear reactors at various sites. The Nuclear Suppliers Group harshly criticizes nuclear deals between China-Pakistan, but both countries ignored any criticism and argued that they will continue collaboration to maintain regional balance of power and peace.

## CONCLUSION

China is an all-weather and time tested friend of Pakistan from last six decades. China's interests lies towards Pakistan to maintain regional balance of power and constrain Indian might in South Asia. While Pakistan's ties with China are best known to acquire economic, military and nuclear assistance to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. United States-India signed civil nuclear deal in 2005 and it alarm regional countries. Especially it brought serious implications for China-Pakistan security environment. It destabilized the existing balance of power and tilted weight in India's favor. Thus, Pakistan-China realized about India's intentions during the post nuclear deal, they transformed their relations in strategic partnership. Before the deal china adopted neutral position on many Indo-Pakistan crisis; including Kashmir, Kargil crisis and Indo-Pak 2001-2002 border tensions. But after deal, china drifted back its tilt on pro-Pakistan position on Kashmir Issue. Similarly China saved Pakistan from international political isolation through providing diplomatic support in UN Security Council and beyond. China-Pakistan signed Treaty of friendship, peace and good neighborly relations which reflects open alliance of both states. Besides various military cooperation agreements, economic and investment and Joint military exercises boosts understanding between two countries. To materialize strategic interests, China invested \$46 billion in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). But nuclear cooperation was the much needed element to balance the destabilized power system in South Asia after Indo-U.S civil nuclear deal. Thus China signed three agreements with Pakistan to build 5 nuclear reactors at various sites. The main purpose of these deals is to maintain balance of power and to reduce gap between India-Pakistan conventional and nuclear power. The results of above analysis confirm that China-Pakistan views Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal as a threat to their national security and took various measures. The balance of threat theory best describes threat perception by China-Pakistan and reactions against Indo-U.S. nexus.

**Note:** Please see Annexure-I to get enriched knowledge about China's major arms transfers to Pakistan from 2000-2015.

## REFERENCES

Ahmad, A. H.-I. (2013). Pak-China Diplomatic and Military Relations: An Analysis. Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences.

- Akhtar, S. (2014). Sino-Pakistan Relations: An Assessment. Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.
- Balachandran, G. (2008, March 27). Nuclear Realpolitik The Prospects for Indo-US Relations. Australian Journal of International Relations, 61(4).
- Bano, S. (2015). Pakistan: Lessons from the India-U.S Nuclear Deal. The Diplomat.
- Beckley, M. (2012, March). China and Pakistan Fair Weather Friend. Yale Journal of International Affairs.
- Curtis, L. (2008). U.S-India Relations: The China Factor. The Heritage Foundation.
- Faruqui, A. (2013). Rethinking national Security of Pakistan. Op.Cit., , 81.
- Ganguly, D. M. (2006, November). The U.S-India Nuclear Pact: A Good Deal. Current History.
- Haq, D. N. (2011). Sixty Years of Pak-China Diplomatic Relations (1951-2011). Islamabad Policy Research Institute.
- Hartpence, M. (2011). The Economic Dimension of Sino-Pakistan Relations: An Overview. Journal of Contemporary China.
- Hartpence, M. (2011). The Economic Dimension of Sino-Pakistan Relations: An Overview. Journal of Contemporary China.
- Hindu, T. (2006, June 19). The Hindu.
- Kabaraji, R. (2012). The China-Pakistan Alliance: Rhetoric and Limitations. Catham House.
- Kalis, A. K.-N. (2015). Pakistan and Chinese Response to Indo-U.S Nuclear Deal. American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences.
- Kamath, P. M. (2006, June). Civilian Nuclear Deal: Turning Points in Indo-U.S Relations. India Quarterly: Journal of International Affairs, 62(3).
- Kamath, P. M. (2006, June). Civilian Nuclear Deal: Turning Points in Indo-U.S Relations. India Quarterly: Journal of International Affairs, 62(3).
- Khan, Z. A. (2013, January-June). Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser. South Asian Studies, 28(1).
- Milholin, G. (2006, November). The U.S-India Nuclear Pact: Bad for Security. Current History.
- Muhammad, A. S. (2006, July). Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Implications on South Asian Security Environment. The L. Stimson Center.

- Pant, H. V. (2012, Winter). The Pakistan Thorn in China-India-U.S Relations. *The Washington Quarterly*.
- Paul, T. V. (2003, Summer). Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power. *The Nonproliferation Review*.
- Pinto, K. A.-S. (2012). India-U.S Security Relations: Current Engagement. Congress Research Service.
- Power Loop, China Provides Nuclear Reactors to Pakistan. (2014, January). *Jane's Intelligence Review*.
- Prime Minister's Suo Motu Statement on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the US: Implementation of India's Separation Plan. (2006, March 7). *The Hindu*. Retrieved from [www.thehindu.com/thehindu/nic/pmspeech.htm](http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/nic/pmspeech.htm).
- Rakisits, C. (2012). Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011: A Deepening but Cautious Partnership. *Security Challenges*.
- Ramana, Z. M. (2006, January/February). Wrong ends, means, and needs: Behind the U.S nuclear deal with India. *Arms Control Today*.
- Rehman, I. (2009). Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's Counter-Containment of China in Asia. *Asian Security*.
- Saurabh, P. (2015). Opinion: India and U.S grow closer against a backdrop of an expansionist China. *USNI News*.
- Shah, S. (2014). Pakistan in Talks to Acquire 3 Nuclear Plants from China. *The Wall Street Journal*.
- Siddiqui, J. Y.-R. (2011). About an All Weather Relationship: Security Foundations of Sino-Pakistan Relations Since 9/11. *Journal of Contemporary China*.
- Siddiqui, R. A. (2014). China's Evolving Posture in South Asia: Some Reflections. *IPRI Journal*.
- Singh, P. K. (2010). Revisiting China's Kashmir Policy. *Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis*.
- Singh, S. (2008). The Kargil Conflict: Why and How of China's Neutrality. *Strategic Analysis*.
- Small, A. (2010). China's Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan. *The Washington Quarterly*.
- Small, A. (2013). *The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics*. Oxford University Press.
- Smith, P. J. (2013). The Tilting Triangle: Geopolitics of the China-India-Pakistan Relationship. *Comparative Strategy*.
- Thomas, M. T. (2006, Spring). The U.S-Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Nonproliferation Goals. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*.
- Walt, S. M. (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell University Press.
- Xiaokun, W. H. (2010, November 18). Pakistan seeks closer military ties with China. Retrieved June 25, 2016, from *China Daily*: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-11/18/content\\_11570282.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-11/18/content_11570282.htm)

## ANNEXURE I

China's Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons to Pakistan: Sorted by Supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2000 to 2015

Recipient/Supplier (S) or Licenser (L)	No. of Ordered	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of Order	Year of Delivery	No. of delivered/produced
<b>China</b>						
<b>L: Pakistan</b>	-	Red Arrow-8	Anti-tank missile	1989	1990-2015	22850
	-	QW-1 Vanguard	Portable Sam	1993	1994-2015	1950
	65	W-653/Type-653	ARV	1994	1995-2000	65
	500	Type-90-2/MBT-2000	Tank	1998	2001-2015	358
	50	JF-17 Thunder/FC-1	FGA Aircraft	1999	2007-2013	50
	6	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/Combat ac	2001	2003	6
	4	F-22	Frigate	2005	2009-2013	4
	27	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/Combat ac	2005	2007-2010	27
	48	A-100 300mm	Self-propelled MRL	2008	2011-2013	48
	2	Azmat	FAC	2010	2012-2014	2
	50	JF-17 Thunder/FC-1	FGA Aircraft	2011	2015	16
	50	JF-17 Thunder/FC-1	FGA Aircraft	2012	not yet ordered by end-2014	
	2	Azmat	FAC	2013	delivery2016-2017	
	6	SCTC OPV	OPV	2015		
	8	Type-041/Yuan	Submarine	2015		
<b>R: Pakistan</b>						
	87	Type-59-1 130mm	Towed gun	1992	1998-2000	87
	46	F-7MG	Fighter Aircraft	2001	2001-2003	46
	11	F-7MG	Fighter Aircraft	2002	2003	11
	6	A-5C/Fantan	FGA Aircraft	2003	2003	6
	20	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	2003	2006	20
	143	D-30 122mm	Towed gun	2003	2003-2004	143
	2	Type-347G	Fire control radar	2003	2006	2
	1	YLC-2	Air search radar	2003	2003	1
	10	YLC-6	Air search radar	2003	2005-2006	10
	6	AS565S Panther	ASW helicopter	2005	2009-2010	6
	70	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	2005	2009-2010	70
	100	R-44- Crotale	SAM	2005	2009-2013	100
	800	PL-12/SD-10	BVRAAM	2006	2010-2015	375
	1000	PL-5E	SRAAM	2006	2009-2015	560

100	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	2008	2012-2015	40
750	LS-3	Guided bomb	2008	2010-2015	425
1000	LS-6-500	Guided bomb	2008	2010-2015	425
750	LT-2	Guided bomb	2008	2010-2015	400
2	SLC-2	Arty locating radar	2008	2010	2
150	WMD-7	Aircraft EO system	2008	2009-2015	65
4	ZDK-03	AEW&C aircraft	2008	2011-2014	4
50	FN-6	Portable Sam	2009	2010	50
30	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	2010	2012-2014	30
50	CM-400 AKG	Anti-ship missile	2010	2012-2015	40
4	F-7A/J-7	Fighter Aircraft	2010	2010	4
20	GDF 35mm	AA gun	2011	2012	20
100	LD-10	ARM	2011	2014-2015	50
10	Skyguard	Fire control radar	2011	2012	10
30	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	2013		
10	FM-90	SAM system	2013	2014-2015	7
400	FM-90	SAM	2013	2014-2015	275
8	IBIS-150	Air search radar	2014		\$40 m deal
150	LY-80	SAM	2014		
3	LY-80	SAM system	2014		\$226 m deal
3	WZ-10	Combat helicopter	2014	2015	3
100	Yu-4 533mm	AS torpedo	2014		For 6 Type-041 Submarines
80	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	2015		For 6 Type-041 (S-20) submarines
100	SET-65E 533mm	ASW torpedo	2015		Yu-3 version; for Type 041 submarines

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer.